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RECONCILING THE VOLCKER RULE WITH THE
DODD-FRANK ACT’S OBJECTIVES: HOW TO
BEST COMBAT SYSTEMIC RISK
Michael Leonidas Nester*
This Note examines the Dodd-Frank Act’s ban on proprietary trading and
on banks sponsoring hedge funds and private equity funds, known as the
Volcker Rule. This Rule has been a point of contention since the Act was
passed in 2010. Some argue that the ban is either a detriment to bond market
liquidity or is unnecessary because a tenuous nexus exists between
proprietary trading and true causes of the 2008 financial crisis. Proponents
cite the role of proprietary trading in the crisis and the inherent risk that
banks accept when engaging in such trading. The controversy surrounding
the Volcker Rule has led individuals in politics and finance to discuss whether
to amend, or even repeal, the Rule.
This Note explores arguments for and against the Volcker Rule and
ultimately offers recommendations to amend the Rule while maintaining its
(and Dodd-Frank’s) venerable goal of curbing systemic risk. First, this Note
begins with a discussion of the causes of the financial crisis and systemic risk
before explaining the Rule’s provisions. This background provides the
groundwork for the ongoing debate about the Volcker Rule and whether there
should be a change in the language of the Rule. Proponents and opponents
have clashed on multiple issues, such as whether proprietary trading played
a significant role in the financial crisis and whether it actually reduces
systemic risk. Understanding arguments on both sides is crucial to assess
whether and how the Volcker Rule should be amended in light of systemic
risk. This Note concludes that neither outright repeal of the Rule nor leaving
it fully intact are appropriate. Rather, this Note offers recommendations to
amend it in a way that balances banks’ desires to engage in profitable trading
with the global interest in curbing systemic risk in the financial system.
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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2008 shook the U.S. economy and caused
Americans to lose faith in financial markets. While the causes of the crisis
are debated, many entities were held accountable for this economic collapse.1
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was tasked with
determining the causes of the crisis, and its final report assigned blame to

1. See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter FCIC FINAL REPORT],
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RAD9DZT9].
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many private actors in the financial sector2 but also chastised public entities
for their role in the crisis.3 Banking institutions shared much of the blame.4
Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on July 21, 2010, in response to
the crisis, which reflected concern for the role banks played in causing these
financial troubles.5 The Act’s stated purpose illustrates the government’s
focus on curtailing banking institutions’ reckless behavior and protecting the
nation’s financial stability. This purpose makes clear that the Act seeks “[t]o
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to
fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices.”6
Dodd-Frank has proven to be a point of contention, especially as talk about
amending the law consumed Capitol Hill after the 2016 presidential election.7
One of the Act’s most prominent provisions is the Volcker Rule, which is
implemented in Title VI of the Act and named for former Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Volcker.8 The Rule’s aim to prohibit proprietary trading
remains contentious in the national discussion of post-financial crisis banking
regulations.9
2. Id. at xxv (“[T]he failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of
financial destruction.”).
3. Id. at xxi (“[T]he government was ill prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent
response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.”).
4. See id. at xviii–xix (“[D]ramatic failure of corporate governance and risk management
at many systematically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis. . . . We
conclude a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency
put the financial system on a collision course with crisis.”). While a majority of the
Commission’s members concluded that financial institutions were at least partially culpable,
the final report includes two dissents that question the blame assigned to these institutions.
For more information on these dissents, see infra Part I.A.I, which alludes to research that
suggests that proprietary trading, which the Volcker Rule prohibits, played no role in the
financial crisis.
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
6. Id. pmbl., 124 Stat. at 1376.
7. See Gabriel T. Rubin, Biden Defends Dodd-Frank, Other Obama FinancialRegulation Policies, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2016, 6:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
biden-defends-dodd-frank-other-obama-financial-regulation-policies-1480975072
[https://perma.cc/4HTS-7DN3]; see also Robert Schmidt, Trump Administration to Call for
Modest Changes to Banking Rules, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2017, 1:52 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-12/trump-administration-to-call-formodest-changes-to-banking-rules [https://perma.cc/U98V-3LXU].
8. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); see also William J. Sweet, Jr. & Brian D. Christiansen,
The Volcker Rule, SKADDEN 1 n.1, https://files.skadden.com/newsletters%2FFSR_
The_Volcker_Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/B77W-CTVM].
9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1073–74 (2012) (noting that there is “almost no evidence that proprietary trading was
responsible for the failure of any financial institution” in the crisis and that the Volcker Rule
“contains numerous loopholes and exceptions”); see also Dakin Campbell, Blankfein Says
Banks Should Be Unshackled from Volcker Rule, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2017, 3:37 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-09/blankfein-says-banks-should-beunshackled-from-volcker-rule [https://perma.cc/VPW4-DRB8] (noting that Lloyd Blankfein,
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In general, banks engage in proprietary trading when they invest for their
own direct gain instead of trading on behalf of clients for a commission.10
The Rule defines proprietary tradingsuch as derivative transactions
creating counterparty risk11to include instances in which banking entities
act as the principal for their own trading accounts12 to buy or sell securities,
derivatives, futures, options, or any other securities determined by certain
federal agencies.13
President Donald Trump has promised to amend the Volcker Rule since
his presidency began, and the Treasury Department has already taken steps
toward that goal.14 Those in favor of the Rule cite concern for the dangers
associated with a further deregulated banking industry, given the risks
associated with proprietary trading.15 Opponents, conversely, downplay
proprietary trading’s role in the crisis: this mitigation would render the Rule
unnecessary when trying to rectify the irresponsibility in the financial
industry that led to the crisis,16 especially given its detrimental effect on
banking institutions.17
This Note assesses whether and how the Volcker Rule should be amended
in light of its aim to reduce systemic risk in the U.S. financial system. The
Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., believes that the Volcker Rule hinders a
“market-making function that provides a valuable public service”); Schmidt, supra note 7
(“The Treasury Department’s much anticipated report on banking regulations is set to include
measured proposals for revising post-crisis rules, indicating the Trump administration is more
focused on scaling back the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act than blowing it up.”).
10. See Proprietary Trading, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
p/proprietarytrading.asp [https://perma.cc/AVQ9-GGFL] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“Firms
or banks that engage in proprietary trading believe that they have a competitive advantage that
will enable them to earn excess returns.”).
11. See infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing how various interdependencies
between banks produce systemic risk).
12. The Volcker Rule defines “trading account” as
any account used for acquiring or taking positions in the securities and instruments
described in [the rule’s proprietary trading definition] principally for the purpose of
selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from
short-term price movements), and any such other accounts as the appropriate Federal
banking agencies . . . determine.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6).
13. Id. § 1851(h)(4) (“Engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking
entity . . . in any transaction to purchase or sell . . . any security, any derivative, any contract
of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or
contract, or any other security . . . that the appropriate Federal banking
agencies . . . determine.”).
14. See Schmidt, supra note 7. To view the Treasury Department’s full evaluation of the
Volcker Rule and other banking regulations, see infra note 185.
15. See Press Release, Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, Statement on the Volcker Rule:
Reducing Systemic Risk by Banning Excessive Proprietary Trading with Depositors’ Money
(Dec.
10,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2013-spch121013laa
[https://perma.cc/HC6C-EJA9] (“The recent financial crisis and subsequent events show the
dangers that can result when banks trade for their own accounts while disregarding their
customers’ interests.”).
16. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 1073 (“[T]he Volcker Rule faces political problems. First,
there is almost no evidence that proprietary trading was responsible for the failure of any
financial institution in the 2008 crisis.”).
17. See Campbell, supra note 9.
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Rule hopes to further Dodd-Frank’s goals of promoting financial stability and
ending “too big to fail” and bailouts,18 although there are conflicting reports
about whether the Rule actually does so.19 Part I explains the alleged causes
of the financial crisis, systemic risk, and the Volcker Rule’s various
provisions. Part II then discusses arguments both for and against the Volcker
Rule and whether it adequately reduces systemic risk. Finally, Part III offers
recommendations for how to amend the Volcker Rule to allow banks to
continue engaging in profitable trading while ensuring they do not engage in
excessive risk-taking.
I. ORIGINS OF THE VOLCKER RULE
The financial crisis of 2008 prompted polarizing discussions about the
adequacy of American financial regulations. Systemic risk became a key
issue as the crisis marred many American consumers’ views on the financial
system’s integrity and reputation. Congress had an opportunity to curtail
systemic risk after the crisis and used the Volcker Rule as a tool to further
this laudable goal, which was set forth in Dodd-Frank.20 This Part reviews
systemic risk and alleged causes of the financial crisis and discusses the
Volcker Rule’s various provisions. Part I.A discusses the financial crisis
generally, while Part I.B discusses the Volcker Rule.
A. Financial Crisis: Concerns About Systemic Risk and
Tightened Financial Regulations
To set up this Note’s introduction to the Volcker Rule,21 this Part analyzes
the financial crisis and how it prompted arguments about its causes as well
as systemic risk in the banking system. Part I.A.1 begins with an overview
of various arguments about what caused the crisis. Part I.A.2 explains the
concept of systemic risk and how it pertains to the crisis.
1. Causes of the Financial Crisis
Conversations about the financial crisis quickly become contentious, due
in part to uncertainty surrounding its principal causes. As noted above, the
FCIC released a report in 2011, which examined the causes of the thencurrent financial and economic crisis.22 The report, which contains one
majority and two dissenting opinions, recognizes the difficulties in

18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
19. Compare Julie A.D. Manasfi, Systemic Risk and Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, 4 WM.
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 181, 211–12 (2013) (“The claims that the . . . Volcker rule walls are
needed to decrease systemic risk have not been supported. . . . [W]e need a better
understanding of systemic risk before we erect a wall that may decrease economies of scope
and complementaries of these businesses.”), with Press Release, Luis A. Aguilar, supra note
15 (“Today’s adoption [of the Volcker Rule] is a step forward in reining in speculative risktaking by banking entities and preventing future crises.”).
20. See 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
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understanding the “broad and sometimes arcane subjects” it attempts to
explain to the many people who suffered in the wake of the crisis.23
The FCIC’s majority assigned blame to private and public entities alike.
Government housing policies set aggressive goals to extend credit to families
in need of mortgages,24 which led to the collapse of mortgage-lending
standards and allowed the mortgage-securitization pipeline to fuel
irresponsible lending.25 On the consumer side, lenders often willfully
disregarded borrowers’ inability to pay their mortgages, and when home
prices began to crash and borrowers defaulted, this collapse “lit and spread
the flame of contagion and crisis.”26 On the banking side, as financial
institutions began to create residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS),
their excessive borrowing with these risky investments made them
susceptible to disaster if their investment values dropped even slightly.27 The
majority opinion in the FCIC report called risk management at these
institutions a dramatic failure, which allowed banks to recklessly take on too
much risk with too little capital.28 Not only was the government “ill
prepared” for the crisis,29 but credit rating agencies enabled the crisis as they
allowed investors to rely on their “seal of approval” of RMBSs.30
The majority particularly criticizes failures of corporate governance and
risk management at “systemically important financial institutions” as a “key
cause” of the crisis.31 These institutions began to engage in riskier trades
over time as they “took on enormous exposures in acquiring and supporting
subprime lenders and creating, packaging, repackaging, and selling trillions
They had inadequate
of dollars in mortgage-related securities.”32
compensation systems that rewarded short-term gains without considering
long-term consequences, which further diluted banks’ sense of risk
management.33 The majority opinion noted “stunning instances” of
governance breakdowns, highlighted by Merrill Lynch’s shock when its $55
billion in “super-safe” RMBSs resulted in billions of dollars in losses.34
The FCIC’s report concluded that large banks were at least partially
culpable, but its two dissents questioned the blame assigned to those banks.35
23. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xii.
24. See id. at xxvii.
25. See id. at xxiii.
26. Id.
27. See id. at xix.
28. See id.
29. Id. at xxi.
30. Id. at xxv (“From 2000 to 2007, Moody’s rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-related
securities as triple-A. This compares with six private-sector companies in the United States
that carried this coveted rating in early 2010. In 2006 alone, Moody’s put its triple-A stamp
of approval on 30 mortgage-related securities every working day. The results were disastrous:
83% of the mortgage securities rated triple-A that year ultimately were downgraded.”).
31. Id. at xviii.
32. Id. at xix. To emphasize this point, the majority’s authors analogized banks to ancient
Greek mythology: “Like Icarus, they never feared flying ever closer to the sun.” Id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,
at 411, 441.
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The dissenters’ claims give context to arguments alluding to how proprietary
trading lacked a role in the crisis.36
At the FCIC, Commissioner Keith Hennessey, Commissioner Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, and Vice Chairman Bill Thomas wrote the report’s first
dissenting view. Their opinion focuses on the global nature of the financial
crisis as a counterargument to the majority’s call for “across-the-board more
restrictive regulations, in conjunction with more aggressive regulators and
supervisors.”37 The dissenting opinion noted that many large European
financial firmswhose regulatory and supervisory processes differed from
that of U.S. firmsalso failed, even though not all of them were exposed to
U.S. housing assets.38 Many of these firms actually had stricter financial
regulations but still failed in similar ways to their U.S. counterparts.39 The
dissent then posed a rhetorical question about U.S. financial regulations:
“How can the ‘runaway mortgage securitization train’ detailed in the
majority’s report explain housing bubbles in Spain, Australia, and the United
Kingdom, countries with mortgage finance systems vastly different than that
in the United States?”40 This inquiry highlights some of these dissenters’
skepticism of the majority opinion’s call for tighter financial regulations after
the crisis.
This dissent lists ten causes, global and domestic, that, its authors believe,
explain the financial crisis.41 It does not reference proprietary trading. First,
a global credit bubble appeared in the late 1990s when large developing
countries maintained large capital surpluses and loaned these savings to the
United States and Europewhere the bubble formedcausing interest rates
to fall.42 This decreased the cost of borrowing for risky financial
instruments.43 Second, a housing bubble appeared in the United States, to
which “many factors” contributed.44 Third, with increasing optimism about
U.S. housing prices and cheap credit, mortgage originators engaged in poor
origination practices that extended “nontraditional mortgages” to borrowers,
which were sometimes deceptive, often beyond borrowers’ ability to repay,
and frequently confusing.45 Fourth, the dissenters highlight failed credit
ratings and securitization. Banks “transformed bad mortgages into toxic
financial assets,” which combined with erroneous credit ratings to facilitate
the creation of more bad mortgages.46

36. For further discussion on competing arguments about proprietary trading’s role in the
financial crisis, see infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
37. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 414.
38. See id. at 414–15.
39. See id. at 415.
40. Id. at 416.
41. See id. at 417–19.
42. See id. at 417–18.
43. See id. at 417.
44. Id. at 418 (“The bubble was characterized both by national increases in house prices
well above the historical trend and by rapid regional boom-and-bust cycles.”).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Fifth, financial institutions concentrated correlated-housing risk as they bet
on high housing prices and held substantial amounts of housing debt on their
balance sheets.47 Sixth, banks held far too little capital and became too highly
leveraged, which amplified liquidity risk.48 Seventh, the risk of contagion is
Large firms’
described as an “essential cause of the crisis.”49
interconnectedness created counterparty credit risk, which led certain banks
to be deemed “too big to fail” and highlighted systemic risk inherent in the
financial system.50 Eighth, large housing losses created a common shock that
hit both large and small banks, but especially the large ones that were
undercapitalized.51 Ninth, financial shock and panic ensued in late 2008 after
“failures, near-failures, and restructurings of ten firms triggered a global
financial panic.”52 Finally, the shock and panic catalyzed the economic
crisis, which created severe harm to the real economy that is still felt today.53
FCIC Commissioner Peter J. Wallison and Arthur F. Burns, a fellow in
Financial Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, wrote the
report’s second dissenting view. Their conclusion criticized the majority’s
call for stricter regulations by questioning whether any financial system,
however heavily regulated, could have survived the blow that the U.S.
housing market was dealt.54 They direct most blame to the vast number of
risky mortgages, whose values depreciated rapidly as the housing bubble
began to deflate. They note that “the role played by the housing policies of
the United States government over the course of two administrations” was
the but-for cause of the risky mortgages and their subsequent decline in
value.55
Wallison and Burns rejected several alleged causes of the crisis that the
majority highlighted. First, to combat the notion that deregulation was a
primary cause, they noted that no significant deregulation occurred since
before the 1980s.56 Despite the repeal of Glass-Steagall provisions,57 which
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 419.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 469 (“Instead of thinking through what would almost certainly happen when
these [housing] assets virtually disappeared from balance sheets, many observersincluding
the Commission majority in their reportpivoted immediately to blame the ‘weaknesses and
vulnerabilities’ of the free market or the financial or regulatory system, without considering
whether any system could have survived such a blow.”).
55. Id. at 451 (“As a result of these [housing] policies, by the middle of 2007, there were
approximately 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages in the U.S. financial system—half
of all mortgages outstanding—with an aggregate value of over $4.5 trillion. These were
unprecedented numbers, . . . and the losses associated with the delinquency and default of
these mortgages fully account for the weakness and disruption of the financial system that has
become known as the financial crisis.”).
56. Id. at 445.
57. In 1933, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act to help prevent bank runs and
mitigate shocks in financial markets. Id. at 29. Among other things, it “strictly limited
commercial banks’ participation in the securities markets” as a partial response to highly
speculative trading in the 1920s that preceded the Great Depression. Id. at 32.

2018]

COMBATING SYSTEMIC RISK

3067

allowed commercial and investment banks to affiliate, there is “no evidence
. . . that any bank got into trouble because of a securities affiliate.”58 The
losses that banks incurred were due to low quality mortgages, and GlassSteagall had always permitted trading RMBSs.59
Second, the majority scorned financial institutions for having inadequate
risk management.60 Wallison and Burns explained that this claim is easy to
argue with the benefit of hindsight:
[I]t is easy to condemn managers for failing to see the dangers of the
housing bubble or the underpricing of risk that now looks so clear . . . . The
fact that virtually all participants in the financial system failed to foresee
this crisisas they failed to foresee every other crisisdoes not tell us
anything about why this crisis occurred or what we should to do prevent
the next one.61

Third, the majority criticized securitization and structured products, which
facilitated the flow of toxic assets.62 Wallison and Burns stated that the
inherent problem was with the risky loans that securitization financed rather
than with the securitization process itself.63 When discussing collateralized
debt obligations (CDO)64 specifically, the dissenters noted that despite “all
their dramatic content,” they were merely a path on which risky loans
traveled throughout the global financial system to cause the actual losses in
the crisis.65
Finally, the majority assigned blame to predatory lending, which Wallison
and Burns agreed “undoubtedly occurred.”66 However, they encouraged
looking at the other side of these transactions as well. Despite predatory
lending, borrowers benefited from low mortgage underwriting standards to
receive mortgages “they knew they could not pay unless rising housing prices
enabled them to sell or refinance.”67 These “predatory borrowers” were a
key contributor to the facilitation of high-risk mortgages in the financial
system.68
Despite stark differences between the report’s three opinions, the majority
is correct in stating that conclusions about the financial crisis “must be
viewed in the context of human nature.”69 The majority noted that blaming
the crisis on greed alone is simplistic and that a few “bad actors” cannot be
58. Id. at 446.
59. See id.
60. See id. at xviii–xix.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. See id. at xxiii.
63. See id. at 447.
64. See
generally
Collateralized
Debt
Obligation,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp?optly_redirect=integrated&lgl=myfinancelayout-no-ads [https://perma.cc/S7HX-JPRN] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (defining a CDO as
“a structured financial product that pools together cash flow-generating assets and repackages
this asset pool into discrete tranches that can be sold to investors”).
65. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 447.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at xxii.
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blamed for a crisis of this proportion.70 The majority ultimately stated, “[I]t
was the failure to account for human weakness that is relevant to this
crisis.”71 Despite the contentiousness surrounding discussions of the alleged
causes of the financial crisis, it is crucial to recognize the debate surrounding
these causes as this Note turns to a discussion of systemic risk and later to
how the Volcker Rule attempts to curb it.
2. Systemic Risk
Systemic risk has no formal definition, but according to Professor Julie
Manasfi, “systemic risk in general can be thought of as a cascading failure,
like dominoes, that affects the real economy.”72 Various working definitions
of the phrase have been recognized and typically focus on economic shocks
and interconnectedness.73 For instance, the Group of Ten74 has used the
following definition that concerns effects on the real economy:
Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of
economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainly
about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to
quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy . . . .
The adverse real economic effects from systemic problems are generally
seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit flows, and
from the destruction of asset values.75

Even absent a formal definition, systemic risk is crucial to understand
because banking entities play a unique role in the stability of the U.S.
financial system.
Systemic risk in the financial system involves “a potential cascading
failure in a system or market due to . . . interdependencies”76 where “the
failure of one significant financial institution can cause or significantly
contribute to the failure of other significant financial institutions.”77 This
hazard is significant because the financial system affects the real economy

70. Id. at xxiii.
71. Id.
72. Manasfi, supra note 19, at 191. The “real economy” is defined as the part of the
economy concerned with producing goods and services rather than buying and selling in
financial markets. See Definition of Real Economy, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?
term=real-economy [https://perma.cc/AG4T-WPY4] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
73. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards
an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1353 (2011) (noting that multiple,
and sometimes inconsistent, definitions have been used, while providing an example focused
on economic shock and market failure).
74. The “Group of Ten” is a group of countries that have agreed to lend money to the
International Monetary Fund. See S.N. CHAND, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 153 (2006).
75. GROUP OF TEN, REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 126 (2001),
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LCU-X34J].
76. Manasfi, supra note 19, at 189.
77. Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010).
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directly and significantly through bank lending.78 Such danger can also
hinder the “multiplier effect,” the dynamic between banks and borrowers
whereby changes in bank deposits change the money supply and the amount
of outstanding credit.79 When a bank receives a deposit, it may keep a portion
of it on reserve and loan out the rest, which increases the economy’s money
supply.80 The borrower of that subsequently loaned-out portion can deposit
it in a bank that in turn keeps a portion of that deposit and loans out the rest.81
Systemic risk’s threat to this dynamic can create a gradual collapse in the
financial system that eventually ripples into the real economy and can create
distress beyond just banks and investors.82
Professor Hal Scott identified four interdependencies between banks that
produce systemic risk, but only one—counterparty risk on derivative
transactions—is relevant to this analysis.83 These transactions create
counterparty risk and were a key issue in the 2008 crisis.84 Credit default
swaps (CDS) were widely held derivatives, and investors seeking to hedge
against losses from RMBSs fueled their popularity.85 This practice
encouraged the mortgage-securitization pipeline that ultimately collapsed.86
When the housing bubble burst and RMBSs lost their value, CDS holders
sought protection from the CDS seller who insured their principals, which
caused sellers to incur tremendous losses:
[W]hen the housing bubble popped and crisis followed, derivatives were in
the center of the storm. AIG, which had not been required to put aside
capital reserves as a cushion for the protection it was selling, was bailed out
78. See id. at 673 n.7; see also Manasfi, supra note 19, at 189 (citing Adam B. Ashcraft,
Are Banks Really Special?: New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced Failure of Healthy Banks,
95 AM. ECON. REV. 1712, 1728 (2005)).
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/
79. Multiplier
Effect,
INVESTOPEDIA,
multipliereffect.asp [https://perma.cc/P98V-QPBA] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
80. See Manasfi, supra note 19, at 189.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 191.
83. See Scott, supra note 77, at 673–75. The other three interdependencies Scott discusses
are interbank deposits through loans and correspondent accounts, net settlement payment
systems, and imitative bank runs. Id.
84. Id. at 675 (“Here the concern is that if institution X fails to settle its derivative position
with institution Y, both X and Y will fail. If Y in turn cannot settle its positions, other
institutions will also fail.”). These derivative transactions are also particularly important when
considering the failure of nonbanks. Id. (“This is one area in which the failure of non-banks is
a major concern, but the severity of this form of systemic risk and the degree of
interconnectedness among financial institutions is currently unknown.”).
85. See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiv. Credit default swaps are a type of
derivative that transfers credit exposure from fixed income products between two or more
parties. See Credit Default Swaps–CDS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/c/creditdefaultswap.asp [https://perma.cc/5LQE-962E] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). An
investor who buys a fixed income asset, like a bond, may also purchase a CDS from a business
who insures the principal amount between the bond issuer and the investor. The investor
receives the CDS in return for periodic payments to the seller until the bond’s maturity date.
If the bond defaults, which renders the investor unable to receive future interest payments, the
CDS allows the investor to receive the principal from the seller. See id.
86. See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiv (“Companies sold protectionto the
tune of $79 billion, in AIG’s caseto investors in these newfangled mortgage securities,
helping to launch and expand the market and, in turn, to further fuel the housing bubble.”).
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when it could not meet its obligations. The government ultimately
committed more than $180 billion because of concerns that AIG’s collapse
would trigger cascading losses throughout the global financial system.87

Interdependencies that create risk do not only exist in the context of large
banksAIG, for example, is an insurance companyeven though banks
shouldered much of the blame for the crisis.88 Dodd-Frank listed various
traits to consider when determining nonbank financial companies’ systemic
risk, such as a company’s leverage, its financial assets, and “the extent and
nature of the transactions and relationships of the company with [significant
banks and nonbanks].”89
B. The Volcker Rule: Hindering the Proprietary Trading Activities of
Financial Institutions
The Volcker Rule is implemented in Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act,
entitled “Improvements to Regulation of Banks and Savings Association
Holding Companies and Depository Institutions.”90 The Rule restricts
banking entities91 from engaging in proprietary trading and from sponsoring,
acquiring, or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in
a hedge fund or a private equity fund.92
The Rule has broad reach, which can be partially attributed to its definition
of “banking entity.” “The term ‘banking entity’ means any insured
depository institution . . . , any company that controls an insured depository
institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of
section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or
subsidiary of any such entity.”93 An “insured depository institution” means
any bank or savings association whose deposits are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pursuant to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.94 A “company that controls an insured depository institution”
may be a bank holding company or a savings and loan holding company.95
A company that “is treated as a bank holding company” under the
International Banking Act of 1978 is generally a foreign bank that has a
87. Id. at xxv.
88. See Manasfi, supra note 19, at 190–91; see also Scott, supra note 77, at 676 (“The
threat of systemic risk (whether real or imagined) results in both the need for government
bailouts at taxpayer expense and in an increase in moral hazard. . . . The politics of supplying
money to banks are unpopular and unsustainable by the Federal Reserve over the long term
without intense public scrutiny and loss of independence.”).
89. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(C) (2012).
90. Id. § 1851.
91. See infra text accompanying note 93 for the definition of “banking entity.”
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1).
93. Id. § 1851(h)(1).
94. See Id. § 1813(c)(2)–(3) (“[T]he term ‘insured depository institution’ means any bank
or savings association the deposits of which are insured by the [FDIC] pursuant to this Act. . . .
[The term] includes any uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank or a commercial lending
company owned or controlled by a foreign bank . . . .”).
95. See 12 C.F.R. § 248.2(c)(ii) (2018); see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, VOLCKER
RULE
7
(2014),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_
Volcker_Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KDS-PWP6].
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branch in the United States.96 An “affiliate” or “subsidiary” of these three
previously defined banking entities are also considered to be banking entities.
However, the following are excluded from the “affiliate” or “subsidiary”
designation: a “covered fund,”97 a portfolio company held under the Bank
Holding Company Act for merchant banking or insurance investments,98 or
a “portfolio concern” controlled by a small business investment company.99
The Rule’s prohibition on proprietary trading restricts banking entities
from being the principal for their own trading accounts100 or from buying or
selling securities, derivatives, futures, options, or any other securities
determined by certain federal agencies.101 Under the Volcker Rule, such
trading is permitted if it is “designed not to exceed the reasonably expected
near term demands of clients”102 or where the trader plans to hold the
instrument as an investment for more than sixty days.103 Despite the Rule’s
broad prohibitions, it allows multiple “permitted activities,” such as
transactions involving federal and state governments and agencies, marketmaking activities, and risk-mitigating hedging activities.104 Some of these
activities allow for offshore trading.105
The Rule’s other prohibition on sponsoring, acquiring, or retaining
interests in hedge funds or private equity funds prevents banks from buying
assets with funds containing some of their clients’ and their own money.106
96. See 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section (1) any foreign
bank that maintains a branch or agency in a State, (2) any foreign bank or foreign company
controlling a foreign bank that controls a commercial lending company organized under State
law, and (3) any company of which any foreign bank or company referred to in (1) and (2) is
a subsidiary shall be subject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and
to section 1850 of this title and chapter 22 of this title in the same manner and to the same
extent that bank holding companies are subject to such provisions.” (emphasis added)).
97. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 95, at 60 (“[C]overed fundsthe Final
Rule’s term for any fund that it coversapply to many entities and investment activities that
would not traditionally have been referred to as ‘hedge funds’ or ‘private equity funds.’”).
98. Id. at 7 n.25 (“[Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Act] describes the authority of
financial holdings companies to engage in activities that are . . . ‘financial in nature.’ Subject
to several conditions, this authority may extend to holding an ownership interest ‘as part of a
bona fide underwriting or merchant or investment banking activity’ in a company that engages
in activities that are impermissible for the financial holding company itself . . . .”).
99. Id. at 7 n.26.
100. The Volcker Rule defines trading account as:
[A]ny account used for acquiring or taking positions in the securities and
instruments described in paragraph (4) [(the proprietary trading definition)]
principally for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent
to resell in order to profit from short-term price movements), and any such other
accounts as the appropriate Federal banking agencies . . . determine.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6). For the Volcker Rule’s definition on proprietary trading, see supra
note 13.
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4).
102. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(B).
103. See Final Volcker Rule, Flowcharts: Prop Trading, DAVIS POLK 4 (Dec. 23, 2013),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/DavisPolk_Final_Volcker_Rule_Flowcharts_Prop_Trading
.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9K6-LP9C] (“A rebuttable presumption that a trade is for a trading
account arises if the banking entity . . . holds the instrument for fewer than 60 days . . . .”).
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1).
105. See id. § 1851(d)(1)(H)–(I).
106. Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B).
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These fund activities may also be considered a permitted activity; this asset
management exception allows banks to sponsor, acquire, or retain an interest
in a covered fund provided that they satisfy certain requirements.107 Banks
must provide bona-fide-trust, fiduciary, or investment-advisory
servicesaround which the fund is organizedonly to customers of such
services of the bank.108 They can neither make more than de minimis
investments in the fund109 nor insure its obligations.110 They cannot share
the same name, or a variation thereof, with the fund.111 Bank directors and
employees cannot retain interest in the fund unless they provide investmentadvisory or other services directly to the fund.112 Banks must provide written
disclosures to investors that they, not the bank, bear losses in the fund.113
The prohibition on hedge fund and private equity fund activities includes
other significant exceptions. A fund may be considered a “wholly owned
subsidiary” where all of the ownership interests of the issuer are owned by
the banking entity or its affiliate, in which case it is not a covered fund.114
Certain joint ventures115 and acquisition vehicles116 are also not considered
covered funds. Within the asset management exception,117 banks may retain
interest in these funds if they own no more than 3 percent of the fund’s
assets.118

107. See id. § 1851(d)(1)(G); see also Final Volcker Rule, Flowcharts: Prop Trading,
supra note 103, at 24.
108. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(i)–(ii).
109. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(iii).
110. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(v).
111. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(vi).
112. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(vii).
113. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(viii).
114. See Final Volcker Rule Regulations, Flowcharts: Funds, DAVIS POLK 15 (Jan. 6,
2014),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/Davis.Polk_.Final_.Volcker.Rule_.Flowcharts.
Funds_.pdf [https://perma.cc/795Q-RHQH]; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
115. See Final Volcker Rule Regulations, Flowcharts: Funds, supra note 114, at 16. To
determine whether a joint venture is a covered fund, several issues arise. Ownership of the
issuer must include unaffiliated coventurers, where ownership is divided between a banking
entity and at least one unaffiliated person. There cannot be more than ten unaffiliated
coventurers. The issuer must engage in activities permissible for the banking entity, which
does not include investing in securities for resale, such as merchant banking. Finally, the
issuer cannot be held out as a private equity or hedge fund. See id. It cannot raise money
primarily to “invest[] in securities for resale or other disposition or otherwise trad[e] in
securities,” which includes merchant banking, insurance company investing, or hedge fund
activities. Id.
116. See id. at 17. Fewer issues arise to determine whether an acquisition vehicle is a
covered fund. First, it must have limited purpose: the issuer must be formed solely for
engaging in a bona fide transaction. Second, it must be limited in time: an issuer must exist
only for the time necessary to complete the transaction. See id.
117. See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text.
118. See Final Volcker Rule Regulations, Flowcharts: Funds, supra note 114, at 27 (“The
maximum permissible investment . . . by a banking entity and its affiliates in a single covered
fund under the asset management exemption, when aggregated with any ownership interests
acquired or retained under the underwriting and market making exemption, is 3% of the total
number or value of the outstanding ownership interests of the covered fund . . . .”).
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The Rule’s activity restrictions address the compliance of nonbank
financial companies.119 Such companies are subject to additional capital
requirements and quantitative limits with respect to the prohibited
activities.120 However, any permitted activities121 that they engage in are not
subject to these new sanctions “except as provided in subsection (d)(3), as if
the nonbank financial company supervised by the Board were a banking
entity.”122
II. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE VOLCKER RULE
This Part discusses arguments for and against the Volcker Rule in light of
Dodd-Frank’s aim to curb systemic risk. Politicians and the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) typically employ pro-Volcker Rule
arguments, which generally focus on proprietary trading’s role in the
financial crisis123 and its inherent risk.124 Part II.A discusses these
arguments. In contrast, many economists and law professors have voiced
displeasure with the Rule for multiple reasons, including its ambiguity, its
off-the-rack promulgation, and its creation of illiquidity in bond markets.125
Part II.B speaks to these arguments.
A. Proponents of the Rule: Why It Works
This Part examines two primary arguments in favor of the Volcker Rule.
Part II.A.1 discusses how proprietary trading played a role in the financial
crisis, and Part II.A.2 analyzes the inherent risk in proprietary trading.
1. The Role of Proprietary Trading in the Financial Crisis
One primary argument in favor of the Volcker Rule is that proprietary
trading must be curbed due to its role in the financial crisis. Luis Aguilar,
SEC Commissioner from 2008 through 2015, makes this argument in his
statement on the Volcker Rule upon its promulgation.126 Aguilar alludes to
the sentiment that public bailouts forced taxpayers to cover banks’ losses due
to their proprietary trading, a “key contributor to th[e] crisis.”127 He notes
119. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2012). The Board of Governors is permitted to determine
which nonbank financial companies it can supervise. See Id. § 5323(a)(1); see also supra note
89 and accompanying text.
120. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2).
121. See id. § 1851(d)(1).
122. Id. § 1851(a)(2); see also id. § 1851(d)(3) (“The appropriate Federal banking agencies,
the [SEC], and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall, as provided in subsection
(b)(2), adopt rules imposing additional capital requirements and quantitative limitations,
including diversification requirements, regarding the activities permitted under this section if
the appropriate Federal banking agencies . . . determine that additional capital and quantitative
limitations are appropriate to protect the safety and soundness of banking entities engaged in
such activities.” (emphasis added)).
123. See infra Part II.A.1.
124. See infra Part II.A.2.
125. See infra Part II.B.
126. Press Release, Luis A. Aguilar, supra note 15.
127. Id.
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that proprietary trading creates substantial investor protection risks: “Indeed,
banks have, in the past, created and marketed products that were secretly
designed to fail.”128 Commissioner Aguilar lauds the Volcker Rule and
concludes that “[p]roprietary trading . . . racked up huge losses and was one
of the factors that forced American taxpayers to bail out the banking
system.”129
Professor Onnig Dombalagian’s similar comments reinforce
Commissioner Aguilar’s statement that taxpayers were forced to cover
banks’ losses due to proprietary trading.130 Dombalagian writes that
regardless of whether proprietary trading was a precipitating cause of the
crisis, it plainly “exacerbated losses in connection with the securitization and
related derivatives activities that contributed to the recent collapse of the
financial sector.”131
Dombalagian further notes that proprietary trading’s destabilization of
cash and derivatives markets, which exacerbated losses in the crisis, is a
justification for the Rule.132 Proponents of the Rule argue that proprietary
trading “increases the complexity . . . and latent interconnectedness of overthe-counter derivatives markets.”133 The largest banking institutions conduct
most transactions in these over-the-counter (OTC) markets so, absent
adequate collateralization and markets to standardize these instruments,
indirect counterparty credit risk rises dramatically.134 In early 2010, Neal
Wolin, former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, made this statement to the
Senate Banking Committee: “Major firms saw their hedge funds and
proprietary trading operations suffer large losses in the financial crisis. Some
of these firms ‘bailed out’ their troubled hedge funds, depleting the firm’s
capital at precisely the moment it was needed most.”135 With this statement,
Wolin echoes Dombalagian’s concern for counterparty credit risk in
proprietary trading before the crisis, as discussed above.
2. Proprietary Trading’s Inherent Risk
A second argument in favor of the Rule rests on the inherent risk of
proprietary trading, which banks seemingly transfer to their clients. The
notion that banks marketed products that were designed to fail, as
Commissioner Aguilar stated, resonates in an article by Senators Jeff
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and
Scofflaws, 87 CIN. L. REV. 387, 392–93 (2012) [hereinafter Dombalagian, Of Scourges,
Scapegoats, and Scofflaws] (“A causal relationship between such proprietary trading and the
financial crisis is more difficult to establish, although it is easier to assert that proprietary
trading exacerbated the impact of the crisis.”); Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive
Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L. REV. 469, 470 (2013) [hereinafter Dombalagian,
Expressive Synergies].
131. Dombalagian, Expressive Synergies, supra note 130, at 470.
132. See Dombalagian, Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and Scofflaws, supra note 130, at 393.
133. Id. at 398.
134. See id.
135. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9 (2010).
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Merkley and Carl Levin on combating proprietary trading after the crisis.136
Senators Merkley and Levin, both staunch Volcker Rule supporters, argue
that creating and marketing products to clients that were secretly designed to
fail is a notable way in which banks put their own proprietary trading interests
ahead of their clients’ interests.137 After massive financial deregulation in
the late twentieth century, competition rose and commercial and investment
banks grew rapidly, which fueled proprietary trading.138 This increase
allowed banks to deal with more complex assets whose risk was transferred
to clients.139
The Senators’ argument centers on a study of a CDO that Goldman Sachs
created in 2006 to reduce its exposure to RMBSs.140 Dodona I, LLC,
invested in two synthetic CDO offerings from Goldman, named Hudson
Mezzanine Funding 2006-1 (“Hudson 1”) and Hudson Mezzanine Funding
2006-2 (“Hudson 2”).141 Dodona purchased $3 million of Hudson 2 notes
and $1 million of Hudson 1 notes in early 2007.142 The CDOs’ credit quality
deteriorated rapidly as the housing market collapsed, and their ratings
subsequently plummeted as Goldman received insurance payouts due to the
downgrades.143 In April 2011, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations cited Hudson 1 and Hudson 2 in its findings on the financial
crisis.144 With respect to these CDOs, the Subcommittee concluded that
Goldman “issued and sold to clients . . . CDO securities containing or
referencing high risk assets that Goldman Sachs wanted to get off its
books.”145
The Senators’ description of the Rule’s prohibition against proprietary
trading illustrates their broad defense of the Volcker Rule: “This is a selfexecuting Rule of law that establishes a clear and strong statutory prohibition
on banks engaging in high-risk activities.”146 They further recognize how
important, yet difficult, implementation of the prohibition and its exceptions
would be: “The statutory language provides significant direction . . . but
regulators must still flesh out the details. This will be a challenging process.
136. See Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Restrictions on Proprietary Trading
and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515,
523 (2011).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 521–22.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 523–34.
141. See Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 630 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
142. See id. at 635.
143. See id. (“By mid-2008, Standard & Poor’s had downgraded $286 million of the
Hudson 2 notes, and the Hudson 1 notes were downgraded to junk status.”).
144. See id.; see also Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111 Cong. VII–IX (2010).
145. Dodona I, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 635. Dodona sued Goldman Sachs, alleging violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as common law fraud, aiding and abetting
fraud, fraudulent concealment, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 630. For a discussion of the
outcome of this lawsuit, see infra Part II.B.
146. Merkley & Levin, supra note 136, at 539.
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In particular, the permitted activities covered by ‘market-making,’ ‘riskmitigating hedging,’ and ‘organizing and offering’ private funds . . . deserve
special attention.”147 They certainly echo Commissioner Aguilar’s concerns
for both the role of proprietary trading in the crisis and its riskiness, which
certain securities offeringsthose seemingly designed to failhave
demonstrated.
B. Opponents of the Rule: Why It Fails
This Part examines various arguments against the Volcker Rule to counter
the pro-Volcker stances discussed in Part II.A. Part II.B.1 discusses how
proprietary trading played an insignificant role, if any at all, in the financial
crisis. Part II.B.2 then addresses alleged ambiguity in the Rule’s language.
Part II.B.3 suggests that the Rule is unable to actually reduce systemic risk.
Next, Part II.B.4 introduces the notion that the Rule’s promulgation was
primarily crisis-driven. Part II.B.5 discusses how the Rule may have a
detrimental impact on bond market liquidity. Finally, Part II.B.6 examines
how parties that are not as regulated as banks have absorbed risk as a result
of the Rule.
1. Proprietary Trading’s Limited Role in the Financial Crisis
The most notable criticism of the Volcker Rule may be that the role of
proprietary trading in the financial crisis was insignificant.148 As mentioned
above, although Professor Dombalagian believes that this type of trading
exacerbated losses after the crisis, he also believes that the notion that
proprietary trading actually led to the crisis is relatively tenuous: “A causal
relationship between such proprietary trading and the financial crisis is more
difficult to establish, although it is easier to assert that proprietary trading
exacerbated the impact of the crisis.”149
Some argue that the Rule’s definition of proprietary trading does not cover
much activity that led to the crisis.150 According to Professor John C. Coffee
Jr., “there is almost no evidence that proprietary trading was responsible for
the failure of any financial institution in the 2008 crisis.”151 He notes that
firms that failed, such as Lehman Brothers, did so because of “ill-advised
principal investments.”152 In particular, Lehman made undiversified,
overleveraged acquisitions of both real estate lenders and developers.153 The
Rule exempts these principal investments, which Coffee uses to suggest that
the Rule may even be “seriously underinclusive” of the true causes of
institutional failure during the crisis.154
147. Id. at 542–43.
148. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 1073–74 (citing Terry Pristin, Risky Real Estate
Deals Helped Doom Lehman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at C6).
149. Dombalagian, Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and Scofflaws, supra note 130, at 392–93.
150. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 1074.
151. Id. at 1073.
152. Id. at 1073–74.
153. Id. at 1074.
154. Id.
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The FCIC report’s two dissenting opinions reflect many critics’ arguments
that proprietary trading was absent in the crisis.155 For instance, the dissents
contradict the majority’s use of Goldman Sachs CDOs as an example of
proprietary trading’s role in the crisis. In the second dissent, Wallison and
Burns refer to CDOs as merely a method of transporting risky mortgages—
the true culprits—which undermines Senators Merkley and Levin’s
criticisms of Goldman Sachs’s Hudson CDOs.156 Although these CDOs
made Dodona incur significant losses at Goldman’s expense, based on their
reasoning, it is possible that Wallison and Burns might advocate fixing
securities with inherent, substantial risk, rather than scorning the methods by
which they are traded.
According to Wallison and Burns, such scorn for the banks’ use of CDOs
does not focus on the main source of market risk that precipitated the crisis:
twenty-seven million nontraditional mortgages that poor origination
standards perpetuated157 with a value exceeding $4.5 trillion.158 To stress
this point, Wallison and Burns critique statements made in a private interview
between FCIC members and Larry Summersformer head of the White
House Economic Council and one of President Obama’s key advisorsabout
whether the mortgage meltdown was a key contributor to the crisis.159
Summers stated that the meltdown was like a “cigarette butt” thrown in a dry
forest, which created a forest fire that was the financial crisis.160 Wallison
and Burns attack this claim with their own interesting analogy to stress the
apparent role that the creation of subprime mortgages played in the crisis:
Let’s use a little common sense here: $4.5 trillion in high risk loans was
not a “cigarette butt;” they were more like an exploding gasoline truck in
that forest. The Commission’s [majority] report blames the conditions in
the financial system; I blame 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages—
half of all mortgages outstanding in the U.S. in 2008 . . . . No financial
system, in my view, could have survived the failure of large numbers of
high risk mortgages once the bubble began to deflate . . . .161

As a potential counterargument to how banks’ use of CDOs built market
risk, Dodona’s suit against Goldman ultimately failed in the Southern District
of New York years after Senators Merkley and Levin’s article was
published.162 The court eventually granted summary judgment to Goldman
against Dodona’s fraud-based claims.163 Finding that such an apparently
damning trading practice lacked fraud may further undermine the Senators’
use of this anecdote in their article to condemn proprietary trading’s alleged
design to fail. The court noted that Dodona lacked evidence to demonstrate
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
2015).
163.

See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 451.
See id. at 470.
See id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 470.
See generally Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 132 F. Supp. 3d 505 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 510.
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certain risks that Goldman knew of but failed to disclose; such thinking was
merely speculation.164 Although emails from Goldman employees indicated
that they thought that mortgage credit markets were deteriorating, such
language did not establish that Goldman’s practice of concealing risk was a
“knowing business strategy.”165 Goldman also had no duty to disclose its
strategy of reducing exposure to RMBSs through the Hudson CDOs.166
Although Dodona claimed Goldman concealed the likelihood that the
CDOs would decline in value, Dodona again lacked evidence showing that
Goldman concealed material investment risk.167 Dodona’s expert testimony
established that Goldman had asymmetric information about its intent and
purpose but could not support a finding for material omissions.168 In fact,
the expert testimony actually established that Goldman had disclosed the
disputed material information.169
2. The Volcker Rule’s Ambiguity
The role of proprietary trading in the crisis aside, many articles employ
other arguments criticizing the Volcker Rule. The Rule’s sheer ambiguity
and intractability is noted as “Wall Street’s most frequent complaint” about
the Volcker Rule.170 This ambiguity has burdened banks as it has “force[d
them] to stay away from the edges of what’s allowed.”171 This anti-Volcker
argument has actually received a degree of bipartisan support.172 When
agreeing with Republican Senator Mike Crapo, the Senate Banking
Committee Chairman, about the need to simplify the Rule, Democratic
Senator Heidi Heitkamp stated, “It is my experience that when a rule’s too
complicated, there isn’t much compliance, so it doesn’t really get you what
you need.”173
164. See id. at 513.
165. Id. at 514.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 515.
169. See id. (“If . . . Plaintiffs’ expert had actually indicated that Goldman concealed
‘important information,’ such as realized loss, there might be a genuine dispute as to a material
fact. However, . . . their expert actually stated that the remittance reports available to investors
did show ‘realized loss’ data.”).
170. Benjamin Bain & Jesse Hamilton, Wall Street Regulators Are Set to Rewrite the
Volcker Rule, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-08-01/volcker-rewrite-is-said-to-start-as-trump-regulators-grab-reins
[https://perma.cc/MS6M-CDSE].
171. Id.; see also Jesse Hamilton, Why Volcker Rule Review Is Music to Bankers’ Ears:
Quick Take Q&A, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2017, 3:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-05-18/why-volcker-rule-review-is-music-to-bankers-ears-quicktake-q-a
[https://perma.cc/2V5F-BX2D] (“Regulators have tried to define the kinds of trades that are
banned, but banks say the agencies have issued confusing guidance and overstepped their
bounds.”).
172. See Rob Tricchinelli, Volcker Rule Changes Likely as Focus Shifts to Regulators,
BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2017), https://www.bna.com/volcker-rule-changes-n73014460637/
[https://perma.cc/65ZJ-7FGG] (“Senate Banking Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-Idaho)
said there is bipartisan interest in ‘simplifying the Volcker Rule.’ Panel Democrat Sen. Heidi
Heitkamp (N.D.) was inclined to agree.”).
173. Id.
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The Rule went through the administrative process both incomplete and
contested before it even entered the rulemaking phase.174 Even before
publishing the Rule’s notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), effectively
implementing the Rule required differentiating banned proprietary trading
from permitted proprietary trading, such as market making.175 Although this
inquiry required extensive rulemaking, it is still problematic today.176 Much
political tension accompanied this issue as critics and proponents clashed on
how broadly or narrowly the Rule should define terms.177 The Financial
Stability Oversight Council received more than 8000 comments on the rule
in a thirty-day period before the NPRM, which is uncommonly high.178 This
high comment activity continued into the post-NPRM period, when nearly
18,500 comments were given.179 This onerous promulgation left tremendous
uncertainty about the Rule’s scope, costs and benefits, and many of its
provisions.180
Outside of the Volcker Rule’s promulgation, there are two particular
sources of ambiguity in the Rule’s language. First, the definition of
“proprietary trading”181 turns in part on the definition of “trading
account.”182 Proprietary trading under the Rule concerns “engaging as a
principal for the trading account of [a] banking entity,”183 and trading
accounts refer to “any account used for . . . taking positions in the securities
and instruments described in [proprietary trading’s definition] principally for
the purpose of selling in the near term.”184 This “purpose test” in the
definition of “trading account” has become a subjective, fact-intensive
inquiry into the traders’ intent at the time of the transaction, which introduces
considerable complexity.185
The second instance of ambiguity is in the line between proprietary trading
and the exception for market-making activities.186 The root of this
exception’s complexity is primarily based on whether such activities exceed
the reasonably expected near-term demands of clients, which imposes a limit
on the amount of securities banks can hold in their market-making

174. See Kimberly D. Krawiec & Guangya Liu, The Volcker Rule: A Brief Political
History, 10 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 507, 522 (2015).
175. See id. at 511.
176. See id. at 510–11.
177. See id. at 511.
178. Id. at 513 (“[S]tudies repeatedly show limited comment activity in connection with
most rulemakings, [except for relatively few] high-salience issues . . . . Eight thousand
comments . . . is, therefore, a surprisingly high level . . . and suggests that the [Rule] was a
high salience issue, even [before NPRM].” (footnote omitted)).
179. Id. at 516.
180. See id. at 522.
181. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (2012).
182. Id. § 1851(h)(6).
183. Id. § 1851(h)(4) (emphasis added).
184. Id. § 1851(h)(6) (emphasis added).
185. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 74 (2017) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT].
186. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (defining proprietary trading), with id.
§ 1851(d)(1)(B) (defining the market-making exception).
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inventory.187 The Treasury has noted that this “Reasonably Expected Near
Term Demands” (RENTD) framework is problematic because banks may not
have enough inventory to make markets in instruments where the RENTD is
too narrow.188
3. Lack of Evidence Suggesting the Volcker Rule’s Ability
to Reduce Systemic Risk
Another attack on the Volcker Rule cites a lack of evidence that the Rule
decreases systemic risk. Professor Hal Scott similarly criticizes the Rule for
its inability to curb systemic risk.189 He posits three main reasons for this
belief. First, proprietary trading is relatively uncommon among banks:
“Wells Fargo and Bank of America, two of the largest deposit-funded banks,
are estimated to earn less than 1% of revenues from proprietary trading.”190
Second, systemic risk in the financial system is not concentrated solely in
banks.191 None of the most notorious failures of the financial crisisFannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Bear Stearns, or Lehmanoccurred in deposittaking banks.192 Third, losses from lending and securitization were the real
cause of the financial crisis and, therefore, focusing on and prohibiting
proprietary trading is improper.193 Scott cites supporting data from Goldman
Sachs, which estimates that losses from lending and securitization constituted
about 80 percent of U.S. banks’ overall credit losses.194
Professor Julie Manasfi’s article on systemic risk and the Volcker Rule
similarly posits that no evidence exists to establish either that deregulation
led to the financial crisis or that the Rule will decrease systemic risk.195 Like
Wallison and Burns’s dissent,196 Manasfi cites the removal of the GlassSteagall wall, but she highlights its boons: “[It] may have allowed banks to
achieve diversification, liquidity, complementaries, and global
competitiveness.”197 Manasfi warns that banning proprietary trading might
erode these benefits and would ignore the “underlying causes of the excessive
risk taking” that facilitated the crisis.198
Manasfi stresses the need for more studies on excessive risk-taking before
implementing a broad prohibition on proprietary trading.199 She echoes
claims that proprietary trading carried a diminished role in the crisis: “[T]he

187. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(B); see also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 185, at 75.
188. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 185, at 75 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 248.4(b)(2)(ii)
(2018)).
189. See Scott, supra note 77, at 676–77 (“[T]he ‘Volcker Rules’ and related limitations on
bank size . . . do not have much if any potential to reduce systemic risk.”).
190. Id. at 677.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Manasfi, supra note 19, at 209, 211.
196. See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 445–46.
197. See Manasfi, supra note 19, at 209.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 211–12.
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financial crisis . . . was likely caused by failures in our financial system that
reach beyond proprietary trading in general.”200 Because of this diminished
role, immediate calls to prohibit this trading activityespecially considering
its potential benefitsmay be overstated. The benefits of proprietary trading
aside, such an outcome would put U.S. banks at a global disadvantage.201
Her conclusion asks, “If we are trying to reduce systemic risk, why not study
excessive risk taking in general and regulate more precisely instead of
banning proprietary trading by banks and systemically significant entities
altogether?”202 This question summarizes Manasfi’s argument as a call to
properly diagnose the problem to treat its specific causes before
implementing overinclusive solutions.
4. An “Off-the-Rack,” Crisis-Driven Regulation
Manasfi’s call to investigate excessive risk-taking before prohibiting
proprietary trading alludes to another argument against the Volcker Rule: it
is an “off-the-rack,” crisis-driven regulation. Professor Roberta Romano best
describes this argument as she criticizes “crisis-driven legislation” because it
“often adopts off-the-rack solutions along with open-ended delegation to
regulatory agencies . . . who perceive a political necessity to act quickly.”203
She explains that the Volcker Rule’s promulgation was tedious and involved
a “lengthy gestation period,” albeit without evidence of industry capture.204
This lack of capture demonstrates the “deep and genuine intellectual
disagreement on both the efficacy and workability of the Volcker Rule.”205
This conflict may further undermine the plausibility of promulgating a rule
quickly in response to a crisis without sufficiently evaluating the financial
industry’s comments on the matter.
Romano reiterates the notion that proprietary trading played “no
meaningful role” in the crisis,206 which further questions the need to enact a
rule concerning an issue that may be irrelevant to Dodd-Frank’s broad
objective of curbing systemic risk. She attacks legislators for focusing on
potentially irrelevant activities like proprietary trading rather than pertinent
ones: “Although legislation plainly should seek to anticipate future financial
crises and not solely address past ones, directing . . . regulatory efforts on
resolving known and pressing regulatory issues over speculative ones is selfevidently a more rational and prudent regulatory agenda, given scarcity in
200. Id. at 212.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. Roberta Romano, Further Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation: A
Postscript to Regulating in the Dark 18 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 273/2014, 2014).
204. See id. at 19. Industry capture regarding the rule’s promulgation refers to “industry
delaying tactics and resistance to wear down, or otherwise convince, regulators to adopt
definitions favorable to banks.” Id. For more context on the rule’s promulgation, see supra
Part II.B.2.
205. Romano, supra note 203, at 20–21.
206. Id. at 22 (quoting TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL
CRISES 414 (2014)).
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agency time and resources.”207 This lack of focus becomes even more
troubling when one considers that the Volcker Rule is estimated to cost
banking entities nearly, if not more than, $4 billion.208 Romano advocates
sunsetting, which would allow Congress to reassess and revise the Rule.209
5. The Volcker Rule as a Detriment to Bond Market Liquidity
Another criticism of the Volcker Rule is that it stifles bond market
liquidity. In his study of the Rule, Jack Bao, Principal Economist for the
Federal Reserve, provides an empirical analysis of the Rule’s impact “on
liquidity for corporate bonds, particularly during stress events.”210 Bao uses
downgrades of corporate bonds to junk status as stress events where clients
demand liquidity. He then compares this illiquidity to a control group both
before and after the Rule’s promulgation.211 Bao concludes that prohibiting
proprietary trading has “significant costs.”212
The study’s primary finding is that the Rule’s net effect is detrimental to
corporate bond liquidity and that, under the Rule, dealers are less willing to
provide liquidity during times of stress.213 Some weak evidence even
suggests that dealers not subject to the Rule have provided liquidity in these
stress times.214 With respect to the market-making exception in particular,
Bao states that
the rules defining this exemption are cumbersome, and their
implementation unwieldy, with the result that bank dealers have indeed
pulled back from corporate bond market making in stress periods postVolcker. This may suggest . . . that “an attempt to separate legitimate and
acceptable market-making from speculative and risky market-making is not
productive.”215

The finance community has echoed Bao’s concerns: “Bankers say it stifles
what is the essence of Wall Streettrading stocks, bonds and other
instruments.”216 Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs has affirmed these
illiquidity worries:
“[Banks] should be able to be principals because market-making is a very
important public function of companies like ours,” Blankfein said. “If we
don’t do that, the drop in liquidity will not allow . . . industries and investors

207. Id.
208. See id. at 23.
209. See id.
210. Jack Bao et al., The Volcker Rule and Corporate Bond Market-Making in Times of
Stress 2 (Jan. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2836714.
211. Id. at 3.
212. Id. at 6.
213. See id. at 31, 37.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 32.
216. Bain & Hamilton, supra note 170.
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to accomplish their objectives, which are beneficial to the financial
markets. There should be more flexibility.”217

6. Less Regulated Nonbank Entities May Absorb
Risk That Banks No Longer Assume
A final criticism of the Volcker Rule is that it pushes risk inherent in
proprietary trading to less-regulated nonbank entities. Professor Darrell
Duffie’s paper on market making under the Rule suggests that prohibiting
proprietary trading could push certain market-making activities to nonbank
entities such as hedge funds or insurance companies, neither of which are
heavily regulated.218 Duffie argues that this shift contradicts congressional
intent and may also “have unpredictable and potentially adverse
consequences for the safety and soundness of our financial system.”219 He
admits that the Financial Stability Oversight Council still designates large
nonbank dealers as systematically important but notes that the Federal
Reserve’s liquidity support is more difficult to arrange for such dealers.220
The assumption that nonbank market makers will have adequate regulatory
supervision, liquidity, and effective capital and liquidity requirements seems
idyllic.221
Private equity firms’ entrance into the RMBS market is evidence that some
nonbank entities have begun engaging in proprietary trading, which
reinforces Duffie’s concerns.222 Banks and government lenders pulled back
from this space after regulatory crackdowns during the financial crisis, which
allowed other entities to purchase their delinquent mortgages.223 Large
private equity firms entered this space and began purchasing, securitizing,
and selling RMBSs as banks had done before the crisis, but with far less
oversight.224 These firms saw an opportunity to invest in distressed assets
that banks and lenders were looking to sell quickly:
As new regulations prompted banks to scale back their servicing of
mortgages, companies owned by private equity went on a buying spree.
Private equity sensed an opportunity as the mortgage servicing business

217. Campbell, supra note 9. In contrast to these liquidity concerns, a report from the
SEC’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis found mixed evidence of any impact on
corporate bond markets, which illustrates the difficulty of directly attributing illiquidity to the
Volcker Rule. SEC, ACCESS TO CAPITAL & MARKET LIQUIDITY 8 (2017). The report noted that
although the Rule and other reforms may reduce liquidity in corporate bond marketsas
dealers have reduced their capital commitment since 2007other alternative explanations
exist. Id. Such explanations may include “crisis-induced changes in dealer assessment of
risks” and “the effects of a low interest rate environment.” Id.
218. See Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the Proposed Volcker Rule 5 (Rock Ctr. for
Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 106, 2012).
219. Id. at 6.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 5.
223. See Matthew Goldstein et al., How Housing’s New Players Spiraled into Banks’ Old
Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/27/
business/dealbook/private-equity-housing-missteps.html [https://perma.cc/8M3G-B8PV].
224. See id.
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became a liability for the banks, leading Bank of America alone to reach
settlements worth billions of dollars over federal accusations of using
illegal foreclosure documents and unfair rejections of loan modifications.
Since 2012, Nationstar[, a private equity firm that became the fourth-largest
collector of mortgage bills,] has bought the rights to collect payments on
more than $450 billion in mortgages, much of it from Bank of America.225

Although evidence suggests that private equity activity in the RMBS
market has benefited the U.S. economy,226 seizing this opportunity has
garnered sharp criticism. Banks, unlike private equity firms, are obligated to
meet the credit needs of low-income neighborhoods under the Community
Reinvestment Act.227 Private equity investment in RMBSs has not benefited
poor neighborhoods in the way that banks would have if they were the
investing entity.228 Private equity firms are also allegedly foreclosing on
homeowners quickly and losing families’ mortgage paperwork, mistakes that
banks have been accused of.229 Private equity firms’ mortgage-originating
subsidiaries face less scrutiny than banks, which raises further concerns that
there is inadequate testing for their financial soundness.230
III. AMENDING THE VOLCKER RULE
The Volcker Rule seeks to advance Dodd-Frank’s broad objective of
curbing systemic risk, but it does so at some apparent expense to the
community it regulates. The issue of whether the Rule ultimately advances
Dodd-Frank’s goals, as well as whether it should actually be repealed or
amended, still persists. Despite tremendous complexity surrounding the Rule
and its implications, this Note proposes certain amendments to the Volcker
Rule with an aim to demystify its ambiguous language. Part III.A discusses
how amending the Volcker Rule is appealing because it is feasible to allow
banks to engage in profitable trading while regulating and curbing excessive
risk-taking. Part III.B details this Note’s recommendations for amending the
Rule: simplify the definition of proprietary trading, broaden the marketmaking exception to the Rule’s prohibition, and implement greater
protections against risk-taking that do not affect trading directly.
A. Striking a Balance: Allowing Banks to Profit and
Curbing Excessive-Risk-Taking Are Not Mutually Exclusive
Neither repealing the Volcker Rule nor completely upholding its current
version seem proper. Notwithstanding credible concerns about its hurting

225. Id.
226. See id. (“The firms displaced poorly performing banks. They also helped stabilize the
nation’s housing market, and it achieved that through smart business decisions about where to
put its money. That, in turn, rewarded investors—which is how private enterprise is supposed
to work.”).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id.
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bond liquidity,231 it is plausible that the Rule does not fully achieve DoddFrank’s goal of eliminating systemic risk.232 Arguments that proprietary
trading played an insignificant role in the crisis233 certainly fuel criticism that
the Rule is an unnecessary, off-the-rack regulation.234 In contrast, whether
the Rule actually does promote illiquidity is uncertain and may be impossible
to know.235 Excessive risk-taking and increasingly risky trading activities
fueled the crisis236 as proprietary trading undoubtedly exacerbated losses due
to securitization and derivative transactions.237
Rather than outright repealing the Rule or completely upholding it, striking
a balance between both sides of this debate seems more proper. This balance
entails curbing systemic risk while allowing banks to continue to profit by
finding a way to allow banks to engage in and profit from proprietary trading
while ensuring that they are not induced to show excess profits in a way that
causes them to carry enormous risk. That latter inducement is an inherent
problem because banks are publicly traded companies; they will always want
to show growing profits to appease their shareholders. This natural
inclination will inevitably push banks toward proprietary trading or other
risky, yet profitable, activities.
The opportunity to potentially amend the Volcker Rule may help
regulators to strike a balance between letting banks follow their natural
public-company instinct while curbing excessive risk-taking in their pursuits.
Banks are likely to be more receptive to this balance than to full repeal.238
Jerome Powell, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, spoke to this notion
directly at a Senate Banking Committee hearing after his nomination for his
current role: “In our view, there is room for eliminating or relaxing aspects
of the implementing regulation in ways that do not undermine the Volcker
Rule’s main policy goals.”239
This Note recommends amending the Volcker Rule primarily by
simplifying the Rule’s language. Members of both political parties recognize
issues arising from such ambiguity and complexity240their most frequent
complaintwhich must be rectified to allow banks to engage in profitable
trading while operating within clear boundaries of the law.241 Such clarity

231. See Bao et al., supra note 210, at 31–32, 37.
232. See Scott, supra note 77, at 676–77.
233. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 203, at 22.
234. See id. at 18–21.
235. See SEC, supra note 217, at 8.
236. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
237. See Dombalagian, Expressive Synergies, supra note 130, at 470.
238. See Ben Protess, Jamie Dimon Shows Some Love for Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES (May
21, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/jamie-dimon-shows-some-love-forvolcker-rule [https://perma.cc/GF5P-NLS3] (noting that, although Jamie Dimon, Chairman
and CEO of JP Morgan Chase & Co., does not disagree with the Volcker Rule’s intent, he
stated that “if you want to be trading, you have to have a lawyer and a psychiatrist sitting next
to you determining what was your intent every time you did something”).
239. Tricchinelli, supra note 172.
240. See id.
241. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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may also help corporate liquidity and market making during times of
stress.242
B. Recommendations
First, this Note recommends eliminating the “purpose test” to simplify the
definition of proprietary trading.243 Such a modification would likely have
support from both the financial services industry244 and the Treasury
Department.245 This test determines whether a trading account is used
“principally for the purpose of selling in the near term,” which establishes
whether a trading account exists.246 Satisfying this subjective, fact-intensive
inquiry governs whether a particular activity is deemed to be proprietary
trading.247 Eliminating this test from the definition of trading account will
focus that definition on whether short-term trading occurs, which
subsequently simplifies the definition of proprietary trading. The rebuttable
presumption that a trade constitutes proprietary trading if a position on a
trading account is held for less than sixty days, a generally accepted
notion,248 may supplant the purpose test to establish a bright-line rule that
minimizes confusion and maximizes judicial economy. The amended
language of § 1851(h)(6) should read:
The term “trading account” means any account used for acquiring or taking
positions in the securities and instruments described in paragraph (4) . . .
for . . . selling in the near term . . . , which is defined as a position that is
held for less than sixty days, and any such other accounts as the appropriate
Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided in
subsection (b)(2), determine.249

242. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
244. See Volcker Rule, SIFMA, https://www.sifma.org/explore-issues/volcker-rule/
[https://perma.cc/5R2D-SKDK] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“[The Volcker Rule] should at
the very least be modified to address concerns of vagueness, breadth and complexity. For
instance, the definition of proprietary trading should focus on short-term trading and eliminate
the intent-based test currently in the rule.”).
245. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 185, at 74 (“A definition that centers on the
purpose of a purchase or sale effectively requires an inquiry into the trader’s intent at the time
of the transaction, which introduces considerable complexity and subjectivity into the inquiry
regarding whether transactions are permitted.”).
246. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6) (2012).
247. See id. § 1851(h)(4) (“The term ‘proprietary trading,’ when used with respect to a
banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board, means engaging as a
principal for the trading account . . . .” (emphasis added)).
248. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also TREASURY REPORT, supra note
185, at 74.
249. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6). The italics indicate this Note’s proposed modified
language.
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Second, this Note recommends broadening the exception to market
Both actors in financial services251 and the Treasury
making.250
Department252 would likely welcome fewer constraints on this crucial
activity.
An opt-out provision from the RENTD framework if certain criteria are
met, as the Treasury has suggested, may unshackle banks from limits to
engaging in market making.253 The Treasury offers two approaches. First, a
bank may opt out of the RENTD requirement if it “adopts and enforces
narrowly tailored trader mandates that ensure that its activities constitute
market making, provided that the [bank] complies with all the other
conditions of the market-making exemption.”254 Second, a bank may opt out
if it “fully hedges all significant risks arising from its inventory of” the
investment at issue.255 Regardless of which opt-out provision a bank uses, it
still must comply with all other clauses in the market-making exception and
the Rule’s broader proprietary trading ban.256 An example of altered
language of § 1851(d)(1)(B) follows:
The purchase, sale, acquisition, or disposition of securities and other
instruments described in subsection (h)(4) in connection with underwriting
or market-making-related activities, to the extent that any such activities
permitted by this subparagraph are designed not to exceed the reasonably
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, but
where a banking entity fully hedges all significant risks arising from its
inventory of the instrument in the transaction, it may waive the requirement
of not exceeding the reasonably expected near term demand.257

Third, this Note recommends implementing three protections to further
buffer systemic risk, which do not adversely affect banks’ abilities to profit.
Under the first protection, various risk and conflict of interest disclosures
may be required for certain transactions made under one of the Rule’s
exceptions.258 Julie Manasfi posits that requiring additional disclosures may
better reduce systemic riskparticularly by correcting potential conflicts of
interestthan banning proprietary trading before having seriously studied
excessive risk-taking:
If we are trying to correct potential conflicts of interest, why not regulate
and require additional disclosures that protect the public from such
250. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(B).
251. See Campbell, supra note 9 (noting that the Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs
believes that the Volcker Rule hinders a “market-making function that provides a valuable
public service”).
252. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 185, at 75 (“Market-making is an important service
provided by banks that does not pose the same risks as speculative proprietary trading, but
banks must comply with a host of conditions to fit within the market-making exemption under
the rule.”).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 76.
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (2012). The italics indicate this Note’s proposed
modified language.
258. Id. § 1851(d).
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conflicts of interest? If we are trying to reduce systemic risk, why not study
excessive risk taking in general and regulate more precisely instead of
banning proprietary trading by banks and systemically significant entities
altogether?259

The majority opinion in the FCIC’s report noted its concern that, before
the crisis, traders were rewarded for quick trades without realizing the longterm consequences; this helped to catalyze a dramatic failure in risk
management.260 The majority viewed this failure as a “key cause” of the
financial crisis.261 The need to complete various disclosures about trades
exempt from the Volcker Rule’s prohibition may help to placate these
concerns. It would make traders think more deliberately about future
consequences of their transactions while slowing down the process.
The second protection calls for a change in compensation systems at large
financial institutions whereby banks cannot pay traders based on trading
profits, which may promote better risk management. This protection would
further mitigate the FCIC majority’s concerns that the inadequate
compensation systems of large banks rewarded short-term gains without
considering long-term consequences.262 The effect of this proposed
protection would complement the first protection of requiring additional
disclosures.263 Ryan Bubb and Marcel Kahan propose a prohibition on
paying traders based on trading profits, which they posit is a “better way to
achieve the objectives of the Volcker Rule, at far lower cost.”264
Notwithstanding intentwhether a transaction is proprietary trading
whereby the trader intends to create profit or the trading is merely incidental
to making profit, such as market makingthis approach would target the
ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading directly.265 It would also
avoid an unintended, adverse effect of the Volcker Rule’s “define-and-ban
approach.” Under the Rule, banks feel threatened and are incentivized to find
loopholes that conceal their trading, which perpetuates the need for
increasingly complex regulation.266
The third protection involves supporting more capital and liquidity
requirements, which may conservatively buffer market-making risks. This
protection is intended to mitigate risks associated with broadening the
market-making exception directly. For instance, Darrell Duffie writes that
regulatory capital and liquidity requirements may help treat the systemic risk
associated with banks’ market making more effectively than the Rule
itself.267 In contrast with the Rule’s market-making exceptionwhich may
only reduce the capacity of market making that banks providesuch
259. Manasfi, supra note 19, at 212.
260. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xviii–xix.
261. Id.
262. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text.
264. Ryan Bubb & Marcel Kahan, Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the
Volcker Rule 4 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 17-27, 2017).
265. Id. at 43.
266. Id.
267. Duffie, supra note 218, at 22.
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requirements treat risk on a portfolio-wide basis and directly consider a
bank’s soundness and potential to cause systemic risk.268
CONCLUSION
The financial crisis of 2008 created a debate about the adequacy of U.S.
financial regulations that will likely persist for generations. It will
undoubtedly prompt future actors in politics and in the financial services
industry to think about how the early 2000s ushered in a new economic era
haunted by true fears of systemic risk.
The Dodd-Frank Act embodied this debate over the causes of the financial
crisis as many of its provisions have proved politically contentious. The
Act’s venerable objective of curbing systemic risk was met with particular
quarrel when the Volcker Rule was enacted—proponents and opponents of
the Rule clashed on the topic of proprietary trading. The issues of whether
proprietary trading precipitated the crisis, whether it is actually a source of
systemic risk, and whether the Volcker Rule truly limits systemic risk have
culminated in President Trump’s vow to at least amend the Rule. He has
taken a tangible first step269 by successfully nominating Jerome Powell for
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who publicly stated that the Rule can be
simplified without hindering its vision.270 We now must wait to see whether
Powell will take action on the Volcker Rule during his tenure as Chairman.
As the Volcker Rule’s fate seems in flux, neither an outright repeal nor the
status quo seem proper given credible arguments on both sides. It seems
most appropriate to strike a balance between allowing banks to engage in
profitable trading while ensuring that they do not take excessive risk or
perpetuate systemic risk in the financial system. This balance requires an
understanding of the sources of ambiguity and complexity in the Rule.
Simplifying the definition of proprietary trading, broadening the marketmaking exception, and implementing further protections to bolster risk
management and buffer market-making risk may help to establish this
balance. Despite this Rule’s remarkable complexity, finding this balance
may be key to ensuring a sound financial system with healthy banks, large
and small, that can regain the trust of American consumers.

268. Id.
269. The Federal Reserve Chairman has no amendment power so this step may not create
an immediate path to new legislation. Powell’s opinion on the Rule may continue a dialogue
about amending the Rule during his tenure that may spur legislative change.
270. See Tricchinelli, supra note 172.

